Slovakia’s Democracy and the COVID-19 Pandemic: When Executive Communication Fails by Steuer, Max David
Slovakia’s Democracy and the
COVID-19 Pandemic: When Executive
Communication Fails
Max Steuer 2021-03-09T09:00:38
In spring 2020, Slovakia was praised for minimizing the instances of the COVID-19
pandemic. By early 2021, however, with Slovakia among the top five countries
with the highest increase of COVID-19-induced death cases, a very different
picture has emerged, highlighting the costs of neglecting democracy considerations
(encompassing human rights and the rule of law) by the executive in particular. 
The perceived success of Slovakia in containing the early wave of the pandemic in
spring 2020 was credited to a combination of factors, including an early response
by the outgoing cabinet, compliance by the bulk of the population and the role of
key public figures in setting best practices. The swift executive action, making use
of the ‘state of crisis’ (núdzový stav) as stipulated in a constitutional act dealing with
emergency situations (krízové situácie), resulted in restrictions of fundamental rights
such as the freedom of movement, the right to assembly or the right to education.
Illustratively, in spring 2020, Slovakia scored worse than Hungary and Poland with
respect to adopting discriminatory measures in the Pandemic Backsliding Index by
the Varieties of Democracy Institute.
This post takes stock of the key Slovak responses to the pandemic since June 2020
until February 2021. It argues that deliberation and justification of the key choices
were missing in the legal policies. Coupled with the technocratic turn of the populist
Slovak government and the ensuing lack of accountability, the Slovak ‘journey from
the top to the bottom’ in terms of effectiveness of containing COVID-19 illustrates the
mismatch between a rhetorical and substantive commitment to the rule of law by the
Slovak executive, that was only mildly mitigated via judicial, and to a lesser extent,
legislative oversight.
Executive Governance: Excluding the Public and
Disconnect with Local Governments
After the gradual removal of the restrictions in May and June 2020, the state of crisis
expired without prolongation, and the Prime Minister Igor Matovi# declared a victory
over the pandemic. The Permanent Crisis Group, established via an executive
regulation according to the Act on Governing the State in Emergency Situations
Except the Time of War and the State of War (387/2002 Coll, Art. 4 Sec. 5), was by
default disbanded, and a period when the executive presented an overwhelming
reliance on expert judgments (such as from the Permanent Crisis Group and the
Public Health Authority) ended.
- 1 -
The summer returned an ‘illusion of normalcy’, with little executive action in place.
The cabinet updated the statute of the Pandemic Commission, another expert body
operating under the auspices of the Ministry of Health (and established according
to the Act on the Organization of Executive Action and Central State Administration
[No. 575/2001 Coll., § 2 Sec. 7]), adding to the cacophony of expert commissions
remote from public scrutiny and understanding. Significant doubts remained,
however, over the execution of the competences of the Public Health Authority (and
its Director, the Chief Hygiene Officer). For example, the prohibition of sales on
Sundays (allegedly to leave sufficient time for stores for sanitation measures) as
issued by the Officer remained in place even after the lifting of the state of crisis,
raising concerns over a creeping ‘hygiene dictatorship’ in Slovakia (the restriction
was lifted in response to public pressure).
The increase of infections in August and September motivated the declaration
of a new state of crisis on 1 October. The restrictions were nowhere near those
in spring; in particular, the executive appeared responsive to the concerns over
human rights violations associated with the state quarantine and the cordoning off of
Roma settlements. Yet, the decisions (such as on closing schools before churches)
remained without justification and continued to be issued formally by the Public
Health Authority.
The steady increase in cases resulted in PM Matovi# declaring to ‘take back control’
of the ‘fight against the pandemic’ in September. Subsequently, Matovi# introduced
the idea of a mandatory nationwide testing as an alternative to the lockdown. The
first round of testing on 31 October – 1 November was executed with the help of
the army (operation ‘Joint Responsibility’, the largest one in Slovakia’s military
history), and local governments. However, municipalities were not involved in the
decision making, despite the fact that the nationwide testing was not supported by
notable experts on Slovak public health. Furthermore, the executive (referring to the
Permanent Crisis Group) decided that a second round of testing would take place in
municipalities which passed the positivity rate of at least 0,7 %. The threshold was
not publicly justified, and given the organization of the testing (for example, citizens
did not have to get tested in the district of their residence or work), it appeared as
arbitrary.
The PM’s commitment to nationwide testing did not waver, and the procedure was
carried out in a similar vein in January, this time under stricter lockdown conditions
(including the closure of churches and ski centres). The situation has not improved,
quite the contrary: the chaotic nature of the measures and the lack of perception of
the executive deciding on the basis of scientific evidence has not been conducive
to public compliance, and local governments have voiced concerns over the lack of
clarity and comprehensiveness of the measures due to their frequent changes and
limited executive communication.
On 3 March, new restrictions came into effect, further limiting the freedom of
movement. In addition, the PM’s unilateral move to purchase the unregistered
Sputnik V vaccines without consulting with EU institutions has triggered a
government crisis, with strengthening voices in support of the PM’s resignation. The
purchase of the vaccines amidst continuing lack of success in reducing the number
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of cases signals the return of ‘state panic’, where the public is in the dark as to the
precise scope of the restrictions in place and the strategies for moving ahead.
Judicial and Legislative Scrutiny
Both the legislature and the courts remained operational during the pandemic.
While parliamentary debates over the executive measures remained minimal, three
legislative or judicial actions should be highlighted. Firstly, a controversy arose when
the executive reintroduced a state of crisis on 1 October 2020. The acting attorney
general challenged the decision before the Constitutional Court, referring to the lack
of justification for reintroducing the state of crisis in that point of time. This was the
historically first proceeding according to Art. 129 sec. 6 of the Constitution, which
allows the Constitutional Court to review declarations of emergency situations. The
Court delivered a unanimous verdict (with one concurring opinion) on 14 October,
supporting the leeway for the executive. Still, the Court (PL. ÚS 22/2020, § 70)
signalled its openness to reviewing further measures, in case doubts about their
constitutionality arise.
Secondly, the legislature, despite the Constitutional Court’s suspension of the
effectiveness of an earlier amendment of the Act on Electronic Communications
that gave the public health authority access to location tracking data (the ‘strongest
weapon’ against the pandemic according to the PM), amended this Act in the
summer in a very similar vein. Moreover, the parliamentary majority overrode the
subsequent veto of Slovak President #aputová in early September. While the
executive gave up implementing a tracking app in October 2020 for logistical and
practical reasons, the case does not shed the best light on the capacity of the
legislative majority to scrutinize executive initiatives questioned by the Constitutional
Court.
Thirdly, the executive prolonged the state of crisis, declared on 1 October for 45
days, for another 45 days on 11 November. Thus, the state of crisis was about to
end on 29 December, despite the continued increase of cases, given that the act
on Act on Governing the State in Emergency Situations limited (Art. 5 sec. 2) the
maximum length of the state of crisis to 90 days. The easy way out was to amend
that Act so that the executive could continue to prolong the state of crisis, subject to
ex post parliamentary authorization of the individual prolongation. This was a readily
available option thanks to the constitutional majority enjoyed by the coalition. A
practical problem arose with parliamentary authorization, however: many MPs tested
positive for COVID-19, and hence could not participate at the voting scheduled for
17 December. To allow them to cast their votes, the Public Health Authority issued
an ordinance that exempted MPs from the lockdown. In other words, an executive
agency enabled MPs to meet and approve an amendment of the constitutional act
that widened the leeway for executive action. The amendment was approved on 29
December and the legislature subsequently authorized the prolongation of the state
of crisis on 12 January. The most recent prolongation of the state of crisis to date
was endorsed by the legislature on 26 February, and it appears that the emergency
situation will remain the norm until a notable change in the infection rates.
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As a whole, the coalition’s constitutional majority (that comfortably allows to pass any
ordinary legislation) limited legislative scrutiny in Slovakia. The Constitutional Court
appears as a more reliable check on the government, having shown that, at least in
some instances, it is capable to decide quickly and substantively scrutinize executive
actions. 
The Right to Assembly and Education: Victims of
the Pandemic?
While a range of fundamental rights was affected by the pandemic, two rights
have particularly suffered due to the lack of executive coordination and clear
communication. Firstly, the right to peaceful assembly (Art. 28 of the Constitution)
remained restricted by the declaration of the state of crisis, even when, on 16
November, cinemas, churches and theatres were allowed to reopen. The greater risk
of assembling in public spaces as opposed to attending cultural or religious events
was not demonstrated. Given the ban, pro-democratic gatherings did not take place.
In contrast, anti-democratic forces continued to assemble. A protest took place
on 17 October, supported by the extreme right and with the participation of ultras.
Another round of protests was held on the anniversary of the 1989 demonstrations
against state socialism (17 November), this time joined by more opposition actors.
The police communicated its effort to intervene proportionately to the seriousness
of the situation, with minimizing violence but investigating those who violated the
law. As a deterring example, it was reported that a man infected by COVID-19 at the
protests had died. The ban on assemblies was not disproportionate on its own, but in
juxtaposition to the absence of other, less intrusive restrictions to fundamental rights,
also intended to protect public health.
The right to education (Art. 42 of the Constitution) has suffered during the pandemic
as well. Similar to the ban on assemblies, schools remained closed when various
cultural and religious gatherings were permitted. Children from disadvantaged
environments were allowed to return to schools on 16 November, but, as a report
of the public defender of rights noted, there was no systematic planning in place
that would have thought of the individual circumstances and needs of the students.
Specific concerns, expressed also by the Slovak National Centre on Human Rights,
arose after the decision of the minister of education from 4 December to make
the attendance of pupils from 5th to 9th grade conditional on showing a negative
COVID-19 test result. Considering the centrality of education for understanding
democracy and developing pro-democratic attitudes, restrictions on the right to
education may have long-lasting effects beyond the pandemic.
Towards a 2021 Outlook
The general direction of Slovakia’s response to COVID-19 does not deviate from
international practices, invoking a mixture of existing competences in emergency
situations, coupled with amendments of key legislation. The role of the legislature
remained limited, at least in part due to the constitutional majority enjoyed by
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the coalition. The operational Constitutional Court has displayed some capacity
to invalidate measures with a potential to undermine democracy. However, the
absence of justification and coherent communication of executive measures casts
a shadow on Slovakia’s commitment to surviving the pandemic without losing
democracy along the way. Judging by the measures adopted in the first two months
of 2021, the concerns are likely to remain relevant this year, and may combine with
questions (such as on curtailing the competences of the Constitutional Court) on the
government’s ambitious anti-corruption and rule of law reform that continues despite
the pandemic. EU institutions and civil society should subject the government to
scrutiny along both lines, rather than constraining themselves to the pandemic-
related measures.
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